When Do Rebels Become State-Builders?: A Comparative Case Study of Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central Somalia by Duffield, Andrew Scott
When Do Rebels Become 
State-Builders?: A Comparative 




This essay is a contribution to the literature on Somali state formation 
by reviving Charles Tilly’s concepts and insights explaining how war-
fare impacts state-building. It theorizes, analyzes, and explains how 
three Somali territories—Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central 
Somalia—underwent such different state-building trajectories since the 
collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. To that end, it demonstrates 
how Tilly’s work may be applied in a modern context, such as to rebel 
groups, unrecognized states, and regional political systems operating 
within a state. It recognizes and overcomes gaps in Tilly’s literature by 
incorporating recent scholarship on Limited Access Orders (LAO) by 
Douglass North. The essay demonstrates how the organization, financ-
ing, and use of violence, as well as qualities about the violent actors 
themselves, influence state-building trajectories.
II. The Theory of Rebels as State-Builders
This article assembles a new framework for understanding the histori-
cal processes that shape state formation. Its modus operandi is derived 
from bellicose literature, which argues that while violence is not to be 
condoned, historically it has been one of the main contributors to state-
building and, therefore, state-formation.
For the purposes of this analysis, state-building is defined as the 
concentration of coercive control over violent competitors, thereby 
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stimulating administrative structures, standardizing one set of rules 
over a reasonably defined territory, and providing an environment for 
competitive exchange over economic and political resources.
Charles Tilly characterizes this process as War Makes States and States 
Make War to summarize the interaction of processes spawned by war 
and state-building.1 The most important components, all of which will 
figure prominently in driving the argument, are as follows2:
(i)  Centralized Control over Territory, by which Tilly means the increas-
ing control and concentration of violence;
(ii)  Development of the State Apparatus, by which Tilly means bureau-
cratic developments arising from the financing and organizing of 
violence through centralized administration; and
(iii)  Process of Civilianization, by which Tilly means a bargaining pro-
cess between “rulers” and “ruled” which leads to the develop-
ment of accountability and the production of political identities.
While Tilly posits warfare as an independent variable to explain 
state formation over hundreds of years of European history, this essay 
will apply it to modern Somali rebel groups and trace their violent 
strategies to appraise whether violent actors performed state-build-
ing functions, in the spirit of Elhawary,3 Taylor and Botea,4 Rapkoch,5 
and Helling.6 It does so by viewing rebel group activities as the inde-
pendent variable to explain state-building. In so doing, it traces a his-
torical analysis of what this study calls the “marketplace for violence,” 
whereby competitors—rival violence specialists—compete with each 
over the production and deliverance of security to their subjects (or 
their “customers,” if we take this perspective to its fullest expression). 
Grounded in concepts borrowed from economics, specifically insti-
tutional economics, this article will deploy concepts like transaction 
costs, economies of scale, and comparative advantage to analyze the 
behavior and outcomes of rebel groups.
Tilly’s analytical tools, this essay will argue, are still essential for 
understanding state formation in post-colonial states. To do this, the 
study will need to overcome the following gap in Tillyan literature 
as it applies to Somalia: Tilly’s analysis concerns the macro-level, as 
opposed to a bottom-up explanation of how organized violence spawns 
state-building. In essence, Tilly’s “War Makes States” logic does not 
adequately explain rebel transitions from violent to peaceful strategies 
that necessarily occur in order for state-building to materialize.
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Douglass North and colleagues7 capture this line of thinking in their 
framework, which explains why rebels would put down arms and pur-
sue strategies akin to state-building. According to this paradigm, vio-
lent specialists and elites come together and control the organization of 
violence in the form of a state, through law and order. This is because 
the benefits of extracting political and economic resources through 
violence are short-lived, dangerous, and less materially rewarding 
than developing an indirect system of control and dominance, such 
as through hegemony of political, legal, and economic institutions. 
Henceforth these political settlements are referred to as Limited Access 
Orders.
State-building at its most basic level is stimulated when violent spe-
cialists and elites consolidate security and thereby provide the first and 
most important public good: the control over the use of force. Once 
violence is successfully controlled through the licensing of force and 
the adjudication of disputes according to established rules, there can 
be expansion and maturation of economic and political institutions.
Together, Tilly and North help us shed light on divergent state-
building experiences between Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Cen-
tral Somalia (henceforth called Somalia). As Tilly wrote, “recognition 
of the centrality of force opens the way to an understanding of the 
growth and change of governmental forms.”8
The essay will appraise the impact of rebels on state-building 
according to their Tillyan qualities, i.e., centralized control over terri-
tory, development of state-like institutions, and depth of political iden-
tity formation. The argument describes how these qualities produced 
legacies that altered the trajectory of state-building long after these 
rebels became state-builders or ceased to exist. Furthermore, the study 
will analyze these legacies primarily through the framework of North 
et al., and thereby show how the nature of the rebels weighed heavily 
on the Limited Access Orders that emerged (see Figure 1 below). It is a 
subtle recasting of Tilly’s contentions, but introduces new perspectives 
that allow us to explain how rebels became nascent state-builders in 
Somalia.
Figure 1. Tilly + LAO Model
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Part III: Case Studies
The following case studies illustrate how the appearance of Tillyan 
processes in the rebel period influenced the character of the Limited 
Access Orders that materialized, and thereby influenced each juris-
diction’s state-building trajectory. In Somaliland we see a stable and 
durable LAO; in Puntland a partial and unstable LAO; and in Somalia 
we see an externally imposed LAO.
A. Somaliland
Somaliland’s achievements in state-building, such as creating function-
ing political and administrative institutions, are normally understood 
in a time sequence that begins on May 18, 1991, when the Somali state 
collapsed and Somalilanders declared independence. A Tillyan analy-
sis begins with its rebel group, the Somali National Movement (SNM), 
whose unique method of organization, financing, and pursuit of war-
fare against the regime of Siad Barre (1969–1991) cultivated state-build-
ing practices during the war.
1. Pre-1991: Rebel Period
Establishing and centralizing control over violence was the SNM’s first 
Tillyan task, and one at which it excelled throughout the war until 
Somaliland claimed independence. The SNM was established in Lon-
don on April 6, 1981, by an elite diaspora group of the Isaaq clan-family 
to defend the northwest, and principally their own tribe, from the dic-
tatorial regime of Siad Barre and its military and economic campaign 
of terror.9 The evolution of this group into becoming the hegemonic 
player in Somaliland’s marketplace of violence was not pre-ordained, 
but resulted from skillful organization and tactical success,10 thereby 
choking off the possibility of growth for competitors and eliminating 
any viable alternative but to participate in peace talks with them.11 A 
third factor that nullified the rise of competition, and unintentionally 
stymied the rise of warlordism, was that the SNM transformed into a 
part-time, widespread, decentralized guerrilla force, tightly controlled 
by elders and their communities. It therefore removed opportunities 
for wartime economic activities, like plunder and extortion.12
The second and third Tillyan processes were the bureaucratization 
of the SNM and the civilianization process—which is the bargaining 
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process between actors and rulers that leads to the development of 
accountability and the production of political identities. This occurred 
to an extent unmatched elsewhere in recent Somali history, as wit-
nessed by the rise of political structures, especially for securing the 
support of important stakeholders such as elders and financiers.13 
Organizing these relationships is a difficult collective-action problem 
that was overcome by the SNM intentionally and unintentionally; for 
example, the Upper House of Somaliland’s future parliament was an 
institutional legacy of the Guurti, the Elder’s advisory body founded 
by the SNM to operate alongside its own Central Committee of civilian 
leaders.14 These, according to Helling, “helped to lay the foundations 
for a post-war state.”15
Furthermore, the task of financing the fight against Barre proved a 
challenge as SNM lacked a foreign sponsor.16 Establishing mechanisms 
to generate revenue is an investment rebel groups must make in order 
to succeed and outperform competitors. The SNM succeeded in this 
regard by establishing a relationship with commercial intermediaries 
of the Abban system (an indigenous credit system constructed outside 
of Barre’s nationalization processes), by encouraging entrepreneurial-
ism but also containing it, and finally, by taxing constituents them-
selves by commandeering one young man and one sheep from each 
household.17 These processes produced a negotiation between rulers 
and ruled in which the opinions of ordinary Isaaq kin mattered since 
they provided the resources to continue the fight.18 Finally, the self-
reliance, self-financing, and self-dependent rebel group took on the 
appearance of a government in waiting.19 It was run by six separate, 
elected civilians, thereby avoiding the trappings of military “big men.” 
Developing into a highly democratic political unit,20 it produced a 
democratic logic that formed the “clan-based system of power sharing, 
which became the basis for government in Somaliland.”21 The security 
of minorities who had supported Barre against the SNM was taken 
seriously, and reconciliation was pursued based on SNM’s ideology of 
“one clan cannot liberate another.”22 The SNM structured the politics 
of state reconstruction significantly and the emergent Somaliland state 
would mirror the SNM in many ways, thereby illustrating how rebels 
can become state-builders, according to Tillyan logic.
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2. 1991–1996: LAO Forms
On the evening of January 26, 1991, the rebel groups fighting Barre’s 
desperate campaign descended into Mogadishu and claimed victory. 
In Somaliland, the SNM were successful in their home-fought victory, 
and convened the Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples in Burco 
on May 18, 1991. Amid pressure from constituents, such as former 
fighters, the SNM and a number of elders declared that Somaliland 
would “withdraw from the union that had joined the colonial territo-
ries of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland.”23 From 1991–1996, 
Somaliland was engaged in a variety of conflicts between the state and 
militias that could have derailed the state-building project and required 
the state to devote significant economic and political capital to achiev-
ing a centralization of coercion. The state’s capacity to respond to these 
challenges illustrates how Tillyan processes influenced the strength of 
the political settlement in Somaliland by creating an environment for 
its members to succeed in consolidating coercion and responding to 
challengers.
The members of the SNM leadership transformed themselves into 
state-builders for Somaliland’s first government in 1991, as they were 
“the only organization in Somaliland with sufficient authority to estab-
lish law and order.”24 The chairman and vice-chairman of the SNM 
transitioned into formal politicians after 1991.25 The institutions cre-
ated during wartime were transplanted into Somaliland’s government.
The progress was set back, however, by the surprising outbreak 
of violence in January 1992.26 In hindsight, we can see that the SNM 
became factionalized without the specter of a common enemy, thereby 
reminding violent specialists of potential opportunities elsewhere and 
lowering the cost of exiting the SNM. The marketplace for violence 
was still alive and well.27 Moreover, the transaction costs of splinter-
ing were reduced as militias were organized autonomously during 
wartime and each clan militia amassed and held onto its own weapons 
in case other violent actors emerged.28 The series of confrontations that 
erupted between the state and clan militias were over strategic assets, 
especially those in proximity to groups making claims of ownership, 
but which also justified the state in accruing the cost of organizing, 
fighting, and claiming control over territories, such as in Burco and the 
port of Berbera, or the airport of Hawiye.29 Fighting between the state 
and militias between 1991 and 1996 involved the heaviest battles since 
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the rebel period.30 How did Somaliland successfully consolidate its 
LAO and eliminate opponents to state-building?
Tillyan processes influenced the emerging LAO by centralizing 
coercion in the state, building an administration, and producing actors 
whose interests were tied to state-building. To respond to groups such 
as the Haber Yunis and Warsengali clans, who saw themselves out-
side of the inner core of elites running Somaliland, Somaliland’s reb-
els-turned-state-builders had to lay claim to resources essential for 
state-building or territory because acquiescence could imply weak-
ness or timidity towards the state’s opponents. Thus, force was used.31 
Somaliland’s LAO responded by disarming groups and reorganizing 
the distribution of rents and power to accommodate actors who could 
be co-opted.32 This was facilitated by the fact that SNM’s monopoly of 
violence meant that the fighting was organized by militia groups and 
not by rival rebels groups of the SNM with state-threatening financing 
and organizational strength; that the state had political institutions 
to legitimate its reprisals against the rebels;33 that it had economic 
resources to buy off groups or hand out patronage;34 and that the fight-
ing was not of rival identities or ideologies since the SNM’s experience 
had predominantly shaped the direction of state-building in Somalil-
and and the president at the time was able to use a statist discourse.35
Moreover, Tillyan processes also influenced the formation of constit-
uencies led by elites with an interest in state-building. These groups, 
whose status or positions were linked with the state-building project, 
thus had reasons to step in to settle disputes and see state-building 
continue. First, the elders intervened by hosting peace conferences and 
adjudicating disputes according to customary law, using traditional 
sources of conflict resolution at critical junctures when state institutions 
were faltering.36 The elders provided disincentives to state challengers 
due to their level of respect in society, which was institutionalized and 
linked to Somaliland’s state-building project because of the creation of 
the Guurti.37
Second, minority groups intervened to settle disputes between 
former SNM members of the same Isaaq kin.38 This remarkable feat 
would have been impossible had the SNM during their insurgency not 
developed a respect for the autonomy of separate clans.39 Minority kin 
groups also had the incentive of enhancing their status and securing 
governmental positions through contributing to dispute resolution. 
Third, the president during this critical period was able to raise sig-
nificant revenue from key businesspeople connected with his clan to 
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pay for the government militia and support state-building efforts to 
increase state capacity.40 This relationship with businesspeople was 
initiated by the SNM and continued into state-building, whereby they 
provided loans and expected benefits in return, such as a stable busi-
ness climate to export goods.41 Tilly reminds us through the insights 
of another historian that, “behind every successful dynasty stood an 
array of opulent banking families.”42 The diaspora and wealthy Isaaqs 
provided the credit. Local business people managed this credit and the 
government proved itself to be a reliable customer. These transactions 
represent a symbiotic relationship that originated in the SNM.43
Somaliland’s LAO thus demonstrated it was durable enough to 
withstand challenges to its coercion, and after 1996, Somaliland saw 
an acceleration of significant state-building. Warfare, therefore, was a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for explaining this initial period 
of state-building. The LAO was equally important as a mechanism for 
holding the coalition together.
3. 1996–2012: LAO and State-Building
The Hargeisa conference of 1996 is recognized as a defining moment 
in overcoming the turbulent dynamics of Somaliland’s first six years. A 
draft constitution was adopted that set the stage for a transition from 
clan-based representation to multi-party democracy.44 Somaliland’s 
government was able to organize a constitutional referendum on May 
31, 2001, which despite some manipulation of figures, showed clear 
support for independence and democracy.45 Elections were success-
fully held in 2002, 2003, 2005, and recently in 2010.46 These accomplish-
ments are rooted in the sequence laid out in Figure 1: Rebel Violence 
→ LAO → State-Building. The SNM cultivated a strong foundation 
for state-building by producing a durable LAO capable of centralizing 
control and eliminating competitors. The fact that this LAO evolved in 
a democratic direction illustrates the Tillyan influence from the rebel 
period, during which the SNM was Somaliland’s first experiment with 
democracy. In addition, it illustrates the fact that the LAO’s successful 
consolidation of coercion matured as a result of Somaliland’s indig-
enous, bottom-up state-building process, which took place without 
significant international attention or funding and thereby suggests the 
importance of political settlements being organized, financed, and, 




State-building in Somaliland illustrates the relevance of both war-
fare and political settlements. The Tillyan processes put Somaliland in 
a strong position for state-building. However, the political settlement 
was called into question and tested throughout the first six years of 
state-building. The state responded to these deviances with persua-
sion, but also with force.47 This process follows the Tillyan logic of 
“War Makes States” by creating demands on the state to organize and 
concentrate its control over violence. The fact that the Somaliland gov-
ernment has regularly contributed circa fifty percent of its budget to 
security and that Somaliland remains a heavily armed society despite 
all of the progress illustrate how questions of violence and warfare are 
never far from state-building projects, even successful ones.48 More-
over, it also shows the importance of a durable LAO, which in this case 
was negotiated between local actors without significant international 
help. This increased the accountability and effectiveness of Somalil-
and’s state-building because it was pursued out of the interests of 
actors genuinely committed to the state-building project—an attribute 
we shall see separates Somaliland from its former partner to the south.
B. Puntland
Puntland’s state-building achievements are limited to consolidating 
its security sector and avoiding a proliferation of violent groups. As a 
consequence, Puntland has achieved a degree of stability and order at 
times reminiscent of Somaliland. However, it has also suffered peri-
ods of intense fighting due to factionalism within the dominant rebel 
group. In comparison to Somaliland, its LAO is partial and incomplete 
due to the legacy of shallow Tillyan processes. For example, consolida-
tion of the public administration, such as the ability to collect revenue 
and encourage economic growth, suffered during periods of turbu-
lence due to a collapsing political order in which actors saw opportu-
nities in the marketplace for violence. The state trajectory of Puntland 
remains uncertain, but in contrast to Somalia’s collapse of control, it 
has fulfilled its founding motivation adequately: to be the cornerstone 
of a future federal Somalia.
1. Pre-1991: Rebel Period
Centralizing control over violence was successfully accomplished in 
Puntland in the pre-1991 period. This process was facilitated by Punt-
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land’s homogenous clan make-up. In terms of the marketplace for vio-
lence, this can help reduce the number of opportunities. First, studies 
show ethnicity can help overcome the collective-action problems of 
organizing young men for violence by allowing political entrepreneurs 
to exploit common grievances and identities.49 The Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front (SSDF), which led the fight for Puntland, conforms 
to this pattern by being an alliance of the clans under the Darood 
clan-family in the northeast.50 Second, the SSDF emerged as one of 
the first rebel groups in Somalia to fight Barre in 1979, also giving it 
a “first out the gate” competitive advantage. Led by military leader 
Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a mutineer from the Barre regime, 
the SSDF began cross-border fighting from Ethiopia into Somalia in 
the 1970s.51 It fought several significant military campaigns against 
Barre in the early period of the civil war. While the literature is unclear, 
the dominant role of Yusuf and other military men in the SSDF likely 
diminished the number of potential challengers. Whatever the reason, 
it proved critical and sets it apart from Somalia.
Paradoxically, the SSDF both emerged as a hegemonic rebel group 
and disappeared from the scene early. Therefore, a significant aspect 
is the relative absence of the SSDF in the affairs of Puntland from the 
mid-1980s to its return in full in 1998.52 Explanations for its disappear-
ance focus on its reliance upon foreign financing from Yemen, Ethiopia, 
and Libya.53 When funding atrophied from Libya, it stopped fighting 
even before the struggle was over.54 If its demise is attributed to a reli-
ance on foreign funding, then we should be reminded of Tilly who 
wrote: “the more costly the activity, all other things being equal, the 
greater was the organizational residue.”55 The process of raising funds 
for war internally spurs bureaucratic and administrative processes, 
such as tax collection and negotiations with capitalists.56 Relying on 
easy money, in effect, can stunt the evolution of a rebel movement in 
its early stages. Lacking funds from abroad and unable to generate 
internal fundraising mechanisms, the SSDF disappeared even before 
the end of the civil war.57
As a result of the SSDF‘s early departure, Puntland’s foundation 
for state-building was positioned differently than that of Somaliland. 
To the detriment of state-building, the SSDF left Puntland without a 
political program or a concept of how to organize power in a post-
Barre Puntland,58 thereby leaving open existential political questions 
such as how to organize power among the sub-clans or what role the 
elders would play. The exposure to democracy experienced by the 
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SNM helped to produce an accountable rebel group and stimulated 
important institutional and administrative outcomes that put state-
building in good stead. This did not take place in the SSDF. Thus, the 
Tillyan influences in relation to Puntland were blunted by this early 
departure. Consequently, there was no compass for Puntland to follow 
in terms of how to charter new political territory, unlike in Somalil-
and where the experience of warfare partially resolved these ques-
tions. It also demonstrates what happens when a rebel group disbands 
before fighting ends and thus leaves unresolved questions revolving 
around distribution of power. These discontinuities in the SSDF help 
explain how Puntland has emerged with an unstable, partial political 
settlement, which in contrast to Somaliland, has less successfully trans-
formed its rebels into state-builders.
2. 1991–1998: Partial LAO
A Tillyan analysis to this point sheds light on the fact that the SSDF 
helped prevent a diffusion of violence across Puntland’s territory. The 
other Tillyan identified processes, administrative capacity building 
and fostering accountability between rulers and ruled, however, did 
not materialize. Appraising the state-building trajectory of Puntland 
with the formula of Rebel Warfare → LAO → State-Building illustrates 
that the weaker performance of the SSDF helps explain the instability 
and lack of durability of Puntland’s LAOs.
The political vacuum in Puntland opened wide when the Barre 
regime fell. As violent competitors emerged in Puntland, the orga-
nizational entropy haunting SSDF was mitigated by a set of threats 
by violent competitors. In May 1992, Yusuf’s allies came together in 
Djibouti to discuss the challenge posed by an Islamist-inspired rebel 
group, al-Itihaad al-Islaami, and a rebel faction based out of the south, 
the United Somali Congress.59 The threat was enough to re-ignite the 
SSDF briefly when on “16 May, the SSDF Central Committee and tradi-
tional titled leaders of the clans of the northeast regions jointly issued 
an emergency decree to effectively dissolve the cabinet…(and) replace 
it with an emergency security committee led by Colonel Abdulahi 
Yusuf as commander of the SSDF militia.”60 Fighting developed, and 
when fifty traditional elders, politicians and other prominent personal-
ities were taken hostage, heavy fighting ensued, which was eventually 
won by the SSDF.61 Fighting with the USC in the south was resolved 
when Yusuf and General Aideed of the USC faction were both facing 
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challenges at home and therefore concentrated on consolidating their 
home support. They signed the Mudug Peace Agreement in 1993.62
Together, these military victories warded off the threat of a disper-
sion of violence across Puntland, which is a significant accomplishment 
never achieved in the south. Indeed, the singularity of SSDF’s military 
might is well recognized.63 However, just as before, the SSDF’s Tillyan 
processes were limited to the centralization of coercion. Outside of its 
military role, the SSDF floundered at administering a functioning state 
despite being the umbrella organization of political actors in Punt-
land.64 For example, the elders, who could be counted on for mitigat-
ing the SSDF’s neglect of developing political institutions by providing 
leadership and adjudicating disputes, were never institutionalized (as 
were those in Somaliland) into the Guurti.65 The 1991–1998 period thus 
witnessed a partial LAO incapable of state-building. Puntland would 
have to wait until 1998 to witness progress on this front.66
3. 1998–2012: LAO Collapses and Re-Emerges
The SSDF’s re-emergence with a political mission in 1998 might have 
convinced optimists that the state-building that was absent during 
1991–1998 could proceed and allow Puntland to “get its house in 
order” and establish itself as a model for a future federal Somalia.67 
Indeed, Puntland’s first Charter was formed in 1998, laying out how 
the region was to govern and organize institutions to deliver public 
goods.68 This set the stage for a disarmament campaign to demobilize 
militias and construct a central army and police.69
However, as in the rebel period, this LAO would suffer similar qual-
ities that stunted its state-building potential. Just as the qualities of 
SNM structured the durability and stability of Somaliland’s LAO, so 
too did the SSDF impact Puntland’s LAO. Its military ethos carried over 
into Puntland’s emerging LAO, and the absence of important bureau-
cratic innovations meant that when violence broke out in Puntland, it 
was between rival militias rather than a state versus rebel challengers, 
as was the case in Somaliland’s LAO. This was demonstrated by the 
series of events that began in 1998, when former SSDF leader Abhu-
dallhi Yusuf, described as an “unreformed warlord” by international 
observers, realized that new political realities were crystallizing such 
that Puntland’s lack of a military and political identity posed a seri-
ous risk to Puntland and to himself.70 He exploited this apprehension 
among different clans and strong-armed his way into the leadership of 
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the SSFF again, becoming Puntland’s first president.71 This paved the 
way for a leadership dispute between Puntland’s other most powerful 
figure, Jama Ali Jama, Yusuf’s loudest critic and from a separate clan.72 
This contest dominated Puntland’s LAO, in contrast to Somaliland 
where the SNM’s civilian leadership cultivated a LAO led by politi-
cians rather than militia leaders. The political institutions created in the 
Charter of Puntland were nullified when Yusuf refused to follow the 
Constitutionally allowed three-year mandate73 and step down as Presi-
dent, turning SSDF’s former hegemony into a remilitarization of Punt-
land.74 The speed with which both sides amassed significant militias 
demonstrated the fragile foundations of Puntland’s LAO, despite some 
progress in disarmament.75 Moreover, this represented a breakdown 
of the leadership of Puntland’s basic political settlement, in contrast to 
Somaliland, where the factionalization occurred at the margins of the 
political coalition, thereby testing the state’s ability to centralize and 
effectively control violence. This reminds us of the centrality of solving 
the problem of the distribution of political resources among the elites 
in order to avoid violence. Instead, Puntland’s LAO was polarized 
until a peace agreement was signed between Yusuf and one of Jama’s 
militia leaders, securing Yusuf’s position as President and his former 
militia rival as Vice-President, thereby cutting Jama out of power.76
Puntland’s LAO therefore suffered from factionalization and discon-
tinuous leadership, blunting the pace of state-building. The problems 
afflicting this LAO are also evident in the SSDF’s poor performance as 
a cultivator of an institutional and social environment capable of less-
ening Puntland’s LAO reliance on key military people, such as Yusuf. 
From the beginning of Puntland’s regime in 1998, it could be described 
as an immature social order, or alternatively, as a “clan dictatorship,” 
deficient in comparison to Somaliland’s strong civil society.77 Puntland 
was administered partly as a “fiefdom,” whereby Yusuf tethered the 
state’s existence to himself and his clan by ensuring that eighty percent 
of the state’s revenue came from his home base of Bosaso.78 Moreover, 
constraining influences in society—such as the Tillyan-described bar-
gaining process with capitalists for funding—were arguably blunted 
by the continuation of foreign donor support, principally from Ethio-
pia,79 which gave Yusuf “the flexibility to chart his own military strat-
egy.”80 It is also interesting to note that, from a Tillyan perspective, the 
peace conferences in Puntland were externally funded81 and therefore 
potentially lacked a set of business interests committed to a state-build-
ing project. The importance of Yusuf for Puntland’s LAO is evidenced 
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in the deterioration in state-building immediately after his departure.82 
Yusuf’s ambitions could not be met in Puntland and he relinquished his 
seat in Puntland for one in Mogadishu, as head of the emerging Transi-
tional Federal Government in 2004.83 The LAO of Puntland, therefore, 
suffered dramatically from personalized and militarized leadership, 
factionalism, discontinuities in governance, and a lack of a vision for 
how to overcome challenges to state-building.
The state-building in Puntland that has followed since the resolu-
tion of 2004 has been “adequate in maintaining relative internal peace 
and stability,” but it remains “utterly incapable of establishing the 
rule of law,”84 and no significant political reforms have taken place.85 
Puntland successfully held a presidential election in which sitting 
parliamentarians voted for Abdiraham Muhammad Mahmud Farole 
as President. He has been in favor of reform and tackling the piracy 
issue.86 Fortunately, widespread violence has been avoided, but this 
fragile peace has come at the expense of institution building as well as 
economic and social development. It has also resulted in the emergence 
of illicit economies, such as piracy.87 On the continuum of state-build-
ing trajectories, Puntland stands in the middle between Somaliland 
and Somalia, but risks sliding back due to the increasing role of piracy 
and illicit economies.
C. South-Central Somalia (henceforth, Somalia)
The state-building experience is radically different in Somalia than in 
Somaliland and Puntland. It lacked the initial conditions featured in 
Tillyan processes, especially a centralization over violence. Its politi-
cal settlement is perpetually being renegotiated, collapsed, resusci-
tated, and collapsed again. Unlike Somaliland and Puntland, the entire 
process has been influenced and, controversially, heavily managed, 
financed, and directed by the international community and countries 
with vested interests. The following paragraphs will trace a narrative 
of how the Tillyan framework relates to the absence of a LAO and thus 
state-building in Somalia.
1. 1988–1991 : Rebel Period
As Barre’s regime crumbled and his monopoly over violence was 
reduced to a group of kinsmen, the first opportunity to form a LAO 
materialized in Somalia. This is due, in part, to the way in which vio-
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lence was organized in the civil war. As opposed to Somaliland and 
Puntland, where violence was concentrated more or less in the SNM 
and SSDF respectively, in Somalia it was diffuse. In effect, the market-
place for violence was much more competitive, with no group achiev-
ing anything close to a monopoly position. This is due to Somalia’s 
uniquely complex clan geography, which is complicated by politics of 
trust between Somali’s kinship configurations.88 The most dominant 
group to emerge in Somalia in the 1980s was the United Somali Con-
gress (USC), a faction that originally included multiple clans but even-
tually concentrated on providing security and pursuing the interests 
of the Hawiye kin group. The marketplace for violence became more 
competitive as all clan-families rationally pursued their own strate-
gies for survival.89 This blocked the USC from achieving what Tilly 
described as economies of scale from violence, and is a key variable 
separating Somalia from Somaliland and Puntland.
In the absence of a hegemonic group, Somalia depended upon the 
formation of a political settlement among the different violent actors. 
This was stunted by the fact that in the absence of any hegemon, the 
incentive structure of the post-Barre environment was to maintain 
maximum violence potential. Deviating from this strategy would mean 
taking a bet on a highly uncertain future outcome without any imme-
diate returns, such as guaranteed safety.90 Such an insecure environ-
ment can be an effective barrier to political settlement bargaining, and 
at best, will lead to a basic LAO in which elites are closely connected 
to their “violence specialists.” Second, the lack of a hegemonic posi-
tion meant that there were more spoilers. As Menkhaus writes, “there 
is a wide range of players who are not necessarily powerful enough 
to shape a peace accord or government, but who have the capacity to 
derail political projects they do not like.”91
Furthermore, the USC shared an important characteristic of the 
SSDF: division between two leaders. Unlike the SNM, which had a 
highly institutionalized decision-making apparatus, developed inter-
nal democratic practices, and made important contributions to solving 
collective-action problems for Somaliland, the USC failed to produce 
a blueprint for how Somalia would be governed, and thus the same 
questions haunt peace in Somalia today.92 The lack of a political pro-
gram for the sharing of power between groups produced an even 
greater security challenge than Barre’s totalitarian government by pav-
ing the way for warlordism.93 Under such conditions, Somalia became 
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the world’s quintessential failed state the moment Barre stepped down 
and the marketplace for violence became diffused and self-defensive.94
Moreover, the violence in Somalia deviated from one of the most 
important dynamics outlined by Tilly: paying for the resources to fight 
is as important as the fight itself. However, the USC and warlords 
escaped this problem by relying on funding from abroad, wealthy busi-
ness people, and, crucially, more and more on looting food aid, exhort-
ing international actors, and extracting rents from competing groups 
and marginal members of society.95 It would not be correct to trace the 
wanton war economy that emerged in Somalia exclusively to this trait 
of the USC, but it is noteworthy that the revenue-raising mechanisms 
employed by rebel groups, if put on a continuum between semi-insti-
tutionalized collection, as in Somaliland, to the pursuit of banditry, as 
was the case in Somalia, has predictive power about the subsequent 
practices of their respective leaderships.
The decline of Mogadishu from being the “Pearl of the Indian 
Ocean” to a chaotic graveyard in the 1990s was born out of the USC’s 
internal and deadly struggle between Aideed and Mahdi, setting off a 
complex web of clan fighting.96 The first effort of international actors 
to plug the political vacuum is a foreshadowing of future efforts. Out-
siders ignored the dynamics of violent actors and imposed their own 
political settlement, out of which a stable central regime was expected 
to emerge. The result was, and is, usually the opposite. “The minute 
Siyaad fled Mogadishu,” Hussein Adam writes, “Italian Ambassador 
Mario Sica is reported to have urged businessman Ali Mahdi, leader of 
a wing of the USC, to proclaim himself President before the entrance 
into Mogadishu of General Aideed and his armed volunteers.”97 This 
alienated many rebels groups who had contributed to Barre’s exit 
and now were being deprived of a say in his successor by an outside 
power.98 As civil war raged between Aideed and Mahdi, the stop-gaps 
on violence were removed and violent actors multiplied throughout 
Somalia.99 For the first time in Somalia’s history, the absence of liveli-
hoods and the lure of profits led a variety of actors to pursue warlord-
ism.100 In Mogadishu alone, nineteen bandit groups terrorized the city. 
These groups were well-organized gangs, “closely linked to various 
clans and work from well-defended bases in the city.”101
Such began a marketplace in Somalia, one where violence was the 
most traded commodity, and it is in large part due to the antecedents 
of Barre’s removal—a tragic reversal of fortunes that should have ush-
ered in a new LAO. Tilly’s analysis says that one of warfare’s greatest 
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contributions to state-building is through raising revenue. The case 
of warlordism in Somalia illustrates how the type of violence and the 
purpose it is serving determine whether it will be helpful for state-
building.102 Moreover, the absence of any semi-formalized taxation 
hindered the emergence of what Tilly describes as a “civilianization 
process” from forming between violence specialists and the constitu-
ents over public goods and social rights and obligations.
Therefore, the USC, as a group upon which Somalia depended for 
a political settlement and subsequently a LAO, was a poor performer 
relative to the SNM and even the SSDF. Its lack of hegemonic status, 
inability to orient political affairs toward a central administration, and 
disintegration into warlordism endowed Somalia with differentially 
weak qualities for the formation of a stable LAO. Understanding these 
processes helps us elucidate why a LAO failed to emerge in Somalia.
2. 1991–2001: The Absence of a LAO Leads to Chaos
The absence of a LAO in Somalia created the world’s most pressing 
humanitarian predicament, providing the justification for a series of 
externally created LAOs that continue until the present time. These 
LAOs involve bringing elites together and creating incentives for them 
to stay together in order to control violence and facilitate state-build-
ing. This approach faces several difficulties, which are present in all 
of the LAOs discussed: the fact that external powers align actors to 
suit their own foreign policy interests; that the actors recognize that 
such settlements are temporary, which creates perverse incentives and 
undermines accountability; and that these external LAOs impose arti-
ficial distributions of power and rents.
The first international conference organized by outside powers to 
put an end to Somalia’s power vacuum was the Djibouti conference, 
with the objective of forming a national government.103 Due to the 
internal power struggles within the USC for nominating a leader, and 
the apparent machinations of Italy and Egypt in having their chosen 
leader elected, Aideed chose not to attend the conference.104 This top-
down approach, which was driven principally by the interests of out-
siders to confirm Mahdi and reject the independence of Somaliland, set 
a precedent for failure. Mahdi himself became too impatient to await 
the parliamentary nomination process spelled out in the illegitimate 
and unsuccessful Djibouti conference, and he “had himself sworn in 
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upon his return.”105 He also tried to establish a Cabinet that excluded 
members associated with Aideed.106
The same logic applies to the United Nations missions in Somalia, 
UNOSOM 1 and UNOSOM 2. Each attempted to build a LAO when 
one did not exist. They were the most expensive humanitarian missions 
ever undertaken,107 and yet evidence in their favor is negligible. First, 
they required a political coalition ready to form, something Somalia 
transparently did not possess.108 Second, the only individuals remotely 
capable of doing that were warlords, some of whom UNOSOM made 
its mission to destroy, such as Aideed who had a bounty on his head. 
In addition, the process of pursuing these goals through force under-
mined the fragile relationships with Somalis. Third, it was clear that 
the U.N. was a transient political power, therefore the rational strategy 
of groups was to outlive the U.N., amass weapons and gain strength in 
the meantime, loot aid if possible, and then re-emerge when it left.109 
Third, the perceived lack of neutrality meant that some groups were 
seen as benefiting and others losing. State-building therefore took on 
a zero-sum game dynamic.110 Any political coalition that emerged 
would be undermining another coalition from forming. These factors 
help explain how the UNOSOM missions in many ways increased 
the violence, and when they left, despite billions of dollars spent on 
nation-building, Somalia was arguably in worse shape than when 
they arrived. As Bryden says about UNOSOM’s departure, “Ironically, 
UNOSOM probably left Somalia more heavily armed than it had found 
it.”111
After the failure of the UNOSOM missions, Somali governance 
turned inwards and despite the continuance of conflict, local solu-
tions to governance were forming.112 The most dramatic example of 
this is the steady rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The Islamists 
achieved a degree of stability and control over Somalia that has yet to 
be replicated, and the only precedent for which was the Barre regime 
before 1991.113 The Islamists were able to help solve the problem of 
violence in ways UNOSOM could not because of the Tillyan processes 
it went through: (1) their Muslim identity helped overcome clan dif-
ferences and facilitated a centralization of coercion;114 (2) the Islamic 
courts using Sharia law represented an administrative advance in 
terms of dispute resolution;115 and (3) they had the backing of business 
people who saw an opportunity to increase profits in a more secure 
environment and reduce the high transaction costs imposed by mili-
tiamen for safe passage of their goods.116 However, its rise was paral-
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leled by a growing anxiety toward Islamic politics in the West, and the 
United States funded its main competitor, a group of warlords known 
as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism,117 
which was eventually defeated by the ICU. The ICU’s centralization 
of control was nearly complete in 2006, leading to what “appeared as 
though the reign of Somalia’s warlords had finally come to an end.”118
From a Tillyan perspective, this was the first player to achieve nearly 
a hegemonic position, which qualifies the ICU as Somalia’s first LAO 
since 1991. If the ICU’s path had continued, it would have been a 
new experiment in Somali politics. However, it was cut short when 
the Ethiopian government, with the backing of the U.S. government, 
determined that this was too great a threat to its national interest. It 
intervened with massive military force to destroy the Islamists, pro-
ducing what Menkhaus calls the most “unexpected and unnecessary” 
battle to date.119 Shortly afterwards, Ethiopia and America installed 
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu as the rec-
ognized government of Somalia. Up until that point, however, it had 
no control over violence and its ministers were too fearful to present 
themselves in the capital.120 This act replaced what was an indigenous 
Somali LAO with a new one that sidestepped Tillyan processes. The 
militia group of the ICU separated and radicalized, producing the Al 
Shabaab group, which is currently engaged in a bloody struggle with 
the TFG and today’s Federal Government of Somalia.
The TFG, and its precursor, the TNG, were an external attempt by 
the international community to impose a LAO in Somalia. The TNG 
was established at the Arta Conference in July 2000, but was eventually 
a failure. The TFG was created in Nairobi in 2004, following two years 
of peace talks.121 It was ostensibly intended to reconcile the moribund 
TNG but in practice was a “managed transition of power from the 
TNG to a pro-Ethiopian coalition known as the Somali Restoration and 
Reconciliation Council (SRRC).”122 From a Tillyan perspective, this has 
several flaws. First, it bypasses the centralization of the coercion pro-
cess. The question of whether it could gain a monopoly on the legiti-
mate use of force on its own was out of the question, yet donors tried 
to disarm groups and centralize force under the new government with 
the help of African Union troops, despite Somalis typically viewing a 
central state suspiciously and a threat to their own security.123 Second, 
the TFG received millions of dollars of funding from the U.N. and 
international agencies and was recognized as the sole representative 
of Somalia. This came before the TFG moved from Nairobi to Baidoa, a 
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provincial town far away from Mogadishu.124 Thus, the TFG received 
recognition before actually demonstrating any ability to govern.125
While arguably an externally funded LAO is superior to no LAO 
since it at least has a basic solution to the problem of violence, it is not 
possible to appraise the counter-factual and predict if Somalia could 
have followed Somaliland’s or Puntland’s path. From a Tillyan per-
spective, external LAO’s lack the unique processes of coercion, admin-
istration, and bargaining that cannot be reproduced or compensated 
for by recognizing sovereignty, development aid, or technical advice. 
An effort at centralizing coercion via African Union troops presents a 
reversal of Tillyan logic in which force is bestowed and unearned, and 
therefore detached from state formation. Bypassing Tillyan processes, 
for example by centralizing coercion or generating an administration 
to raise revenue, therefore helps account for the high degree of instabil-
ity at the center of the TFG’s LAO. The political coalition put together 
by the TFG was by definition transient, but groups outside of it felt it 
was another “cynical attempt to further the political ambitions of one 
Somali faction at the expense of its rivals.”126 As such, externally cre-
ated LAOs suffer from trying to solve the question of violence before 
tackling the question of distribution of power. For this reason, the 
creation of these externally funded political arrangements themselves 
produced warlordism by injecting patronage for fighting state rivals, 
empowering warlords in positions of government, and recycling for-
eign dollars into the Somali economy.
The TFG failed to meet Tilly’s definition of legitimacy, which is 
essentially that “Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities 
will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority.”127 Since the 
TFG’s authority was based on external actors, this should come as no 
surprise. It is still too early to tell the fate of the TFG’s successor, the 
Federal Government of Somalia, but if this essay has any lessons, it 
should be that the distribution of power should be negotiated inter-
nally rather than decided by external powers.
IV. Conclusion
This comparative case study demonstrates the effect warfare has had 
on state-building trajectories in Somaliland, Puntland, and Somalia. It 
illustrates how warfare impacts state-building differentially, depend-
ing on how it is organized, financed, and exploited, and by whom 
and for what cause. Somaliland demonstrated how the SNM influ-
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enced state-building by satisfying all three of the Tillyan processes for 
state-building: coercion was centralized, bureaucratization of the rebel 
group materialized, and negotiation took place between the leader-
ship and the constituents, leading to accountability and political iden-
tity. The SSDF in Puntland satisfied only the centralization of coercion 
aspect, neglecting the other processes determining state-building. 
Last, Somalia’s diffusion of violent actors and the absence of the other 
processes produced an unstable foundation for state-building to take 
place. Tracing these different forms of warfare reveals the decisive 
impact of rebel groups in Somalia and the differential impact they had 
across the country, depending upon qualities that either do or do not 
conform to a Tillyan logic.
In addition to drawing attention to the utility of Tillyan concepts 
and tools for explaining state-building processes, this analysis incor-
porates recent scholarship with the formula Rebel Warfare → LAO → 
State-Building. This model revises Tilly with North’s LAO concept. The 
case studies reveal how this can be useful in explaining the transitions 
from violent strategies to ones complementary to state-building. In the 
case of Somalia, the continual absence of a LAO is the decisive factor 
in the perpetuation of the conflict. Somalia cannot agree on how to dis-
tribute power among its elites, clans, and factions. The absence of Til-
lyan-specified conditions decisively shaped this outcome. In contrast, 
actors in Somaliland were able to form a political settlement, and as 
time elapsed, renegotiate and evolve with it.
Last, while cultivating violence is not a long-term state-building 
strategy, understanding the centrality of violence in LAO formation 
and state-building is essential. As this article illustrates, state-build-
ing is an inherently contradictory process. It is both the cause and the 
solution to the problem of violence in Somali society. No social orga-
nization can provide citizens basic security and public goods except 
for an entity that controls coercion and establishes an administration. 
Moreover, state-building is a complex, non-linear process, frustrating 
the efforts of Somali’s externally supported transitional governments 
and those continually wishing for the problem of governance to just go 
away.
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